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ABSTRACT
X.509 certificate parsing and validation is a critical task which has shown consistent lack of effec-
tiveness, with practical attacks being reported with a steady rate during the last 10 years. In this
work we analyze the X.509 standard and provide a grammar description of it amenable to the au-
tomated generation of a parser with strong termination guarantees, providing unambiguous input
parsing. We report the results of analyzing a 11M X.509 certificate dump of the HTTPS servers
running on the entire IPv4 space, showing that 21.5% of the certificates in use are syntactically in-
valid. We compare the results of our parsing against 7 widely used TLS libraries showing that 631k
to 1, 156k syntactically incorrect certificates are deemed valid by them (5.7%–10.5%), including
instances with security critical mis-parsings. We prove the criticality of such mis-parsing exploiting
one of the syntactic flaws found in existing certificates to perform an impersonation attack.
Keywords Digital Certificates · X.509 · Transport Layer Security · TLS · Parsing · Security Vulnerabilities
1 Introduction
Digital certificates are the mainstay of public key authentication in secure network communications since the in-
troduction of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocols. The requirement for
interoperability called for the adoption of a standardized format specifying both the information which should be
contained in them and their encoding.
Such a standardization action took place within the X.500 standard series by the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), and resulted in the X.509 standard for digital certificates. The standard has been further described
in a series of Request for Comments (RFCs) memoranda [37, 19, 26, 8, 10, 38] by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) and has grown to a considerable complexity since its first version designed in 1988. As a consequence,
performing sound validation of the contents of an X.509 certificate has become a non trivial and security critical task.
Indeed, X.509 certificate validation has shown consistent lack of effectiveness in implementations due to the large
number of constraints to be taken into account and the complexity of the involved data structure. Practical attacks
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against the X.509 certificate validation have been pointed out for the last 10 years, leading to effective impersonations
against TLS/SSL enabled software.
Some among the most renown security issues involve certificates which are deemed valid to be binding a public key to
the identity of a Certification Authority (CA), while such an information is contradicted either by the values contained
in the certificate [29] or by misinterpretations in the subject name contained in it [30], both leading to effective
impersonation of an arbitrary identity. More recently, in [23] it was shown that inconsistent validations were performed
by different TLS libraries, due to integer overflows in the recognition of some X.509 certificate fields, providing ground
for attacks. Broken certificates are common even among the Alexa top 1M visited sites [39], and the diversity in the
Application Program Interface (API) exposed by the existing TLS/SSL libraries was proven a further source of security
issues [16]. The latest among the reported issues on X.509 validation shows that, due to a misinterpretation issue of
the encoding, it was effectively possible to get certificates with forged signatures accepted [12, 11].
An interesting point to be noted is that all the aforementioned issues do not stem from a cryptographic vulnerability
of the employed primitives, but rather from a non systematic approach to the syntactic recognition of the certificate.
Indeed, mainly due to the high complexity of the data format, no methodical approach at content format recognition
and syntactic verification, i.e., parsing, has been either proposed or employed in the use of existing X.509 digital
certificates. All the existing available implementations dealing with X.509 certificates employ ad-hoc handcrafted
code to parse the certificate contents, in turn resulting in software artifacts which are difficult to test for correctness.
A practical validation of such issue is reported in [7] where the authors employed a tool to generate pseudo-random
X.509 certificates obtained by splicing a set of valid ones and inserting intentional errors.
The results of testing common SSL/TLS implementations against such datasets, instead of purely random inputs alone,
helped to uncover a significant number of incorrect recognition issues. However, such an approach does not provide a
constructive guarantee that a parsing strategy for X.509 certificates is indeed sound in its action.
A classical and sound approach to the syntactic validation of a given input format is the one regarding it as the problem
of parsing a language specified by a given grammar. Such an approach allows to provide a synthetic description
of the format to be recognized from which an implementation of the actual parser can be automatically derived,
minimizing the implementation effort and providing guarantees on the correctness of the recognition action. Despite
the aforementioned advantages of tackling the issue by means of a language theoretic approach, such a strategy has
never been employed to parse existing X.509 certificates. We ascribe this both to the complexity of the X.509 standard
when considered as a language over an arbitrary byte alphabet and to the fact that it was pointed out in [23] that X.509
is at least context sensitive, a feature preventing the use of most parser generation techniques. An interesting proposal
for a new regular format is presented in [5]. We report that a language theoretic analysis similar to the one we present
for X.509 was performed on the OpenPGP message format in [4].
Contributions.
In this work, we tackled the task of analyzing the standard specification of X.509 certificates from a language theoretic
standpoint, highlighting which ones of its features present a hindrance for a decidable and effective parsing. After
performing a critical analysis of the X.509 standard, which is specified as a combination of Abstract Syntax Notation
1 (ASN.1, see ITU-R X.680) [22] data type descriptions and natural language defined constraints, we designed a
predicated grammar defining a language which contains all the X.509 certificates employing standardized algorithms
and smaller than 4 GiB.
We automatically derive a parser for the said X.509 language from the aforementioned grammar specification, em-
ploying the ANTLR parser generator [34]. We validate the parsing capability of our parser analyzing 11M X.509 cer-
tificates obtained as a survey of servers running the HyperText Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer (HTTPS)
on the entire space of the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), showing that ≈21.5% of the X.509 certificates are syn-
tactically incorrect.
We compare our syntactic recognition capabilities against the certificate validation performed by 7 widely employed
TLS libraries, and show how a significant number of X.509 certificates which are syntactically invalid are not recog-
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nized as such by all of the current TLS libraries. We validate the criticality of the detected flaws exploiting one of
them to lead a successful impersonation attack against the OpenSSL and BoringSSL libraries.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we report the notions needed to describe a digital certificate compliant with the X.509 standard in a
form amenable to an automated parser generation. In particular, we recall both the key properties of formal languages
and the efficiency of their recognizers. Subsequently, since the X.509 specification is given employing the Abstract
Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.1) meta-syntax, we provide a bridge among its notation and the usual formal grammar one.
2.1 Parser Generation
Given a finite set of symbols Vt, known as alphabet, a language L is defined as a set of elements, named sentences,
obtained by concatenating zero or more symbol of Vt. Conventionally, the empty sentence is denoted as ε, while a
portion of a sentence is known as a factor.
Given a language it is also possible to describe it via a generative formalism, i.e., a grammar. A grammar is a quadruple
G : (Vt,Vn,P, S), with Vt the alphabet of the generated language, Vn a finite set of symbols named nonterminals,
P a set of productions defined as pairs of strings obtained by concatenating elements of V=Vt∪Vn, and S∈Vn
the axiom of the grammar. The productions are denoted as usual as α→β; α∈V+n , β∈V∗, where V+ represents
the closure with respect to concatenation over V, and V∗=V+∪{ε}. A sentence of a language L is generated by
the grammar G if it is possible to obtain it starting from a string u∈V∗ made of the grammar axiom alone (i.e., the
nonterminal S), and iteratively substituting a portion of u appearing as the left hand side of a production in P with
the right hand side of the said production, until the result is made only of elements of Vt. The grammar is said to be
ambiguous, if it is possible to generate a sentence of the language through two different sequences of substitutions.
Languages are classified according to the Chomsky hierarchy [18], depending on which constraints are holding on the
productions of the grammar generating them. Language families generated from grammars with stricter constraints
are included in all the families with weaker constraints. In the following, we describe the language families starting
from the least constrained one. Grammars with no restrictions on the left and right sides of its productions are denoted
as unrestricted grammars, and generate context sensitive with erasure (CS-E) languages. Determining if a generic
string over Vt belongs to a CS-E language is not decidable.
Restricting the productions of a grammar so that the sequence of substitutions does not allow the erasure of symbols
yields context sensitive (CS) grammars, which generate CS languages. Determining if a generic string overVt belongs
to a CS language is decidable, i.e., it is always possible to state whether a string over Vt can be generated by a CS
grammar. Restricting the productions of a grammar to have a single element of Vn on their left hand side yields
the so-called context-free (CF) grammars, which generate CF languages. Deterministic CF (DCF) languages can
be recognized by a Deterministic PushDown Automaton (DPDA) and their generating grammars constitute a proper
subset of non ambiguous CF grammars. Finally, restricting the productions of a grammar either to the ones of the form
{A→a,A→aA} or to the ones of the form {A→a,A→Aa}, where A∈Vn, a∈Vt∪{ε}, yields right- or left-linear
grammars, which generate regular (REG) languages. We will denote such grammars as linear whenever the direction
of the recursion in their productions is not fundamental.
Given a grammar G generating the language L and a generic terminal string w∈V∗t , the process of parsing consists
both in determining ifw∈L and in computing the sequence(s) of applications of the productions ofGwhich generate(s)
w. The sequence(s) of productions are depicted as a tree, called either parse tree or abstract syntax tree, with the
axiom of the grammar being the root and the terminal symbols being the leaves. There exists a straightforward
parsing algorithm of a CS language which is complete and correct, but its running time is exponential in the length of
the input. As a consequence, a number of higher efficiency automated parser generation techniques were defined for
subsets of the CS grammar family. CF grammars are the mainstay of parser generation as it is possible to automatically
generate a recognizer automaton for any language generated by them. In particular, given a generic DCF grammar it
is possible to automatically generate a deterministic parser for the strings of the corresponding language [18]; such
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Table 1: Equivalence between the notation of the ASN.1 right hand side of a constructed type definition and the right
hand side of an EBNF grammar production, with a set of sample ASN.1 types u,v,x matching the identically named
strings u, v, x∈(Vt∪Vn)∗ in EBNF
ASN.1 right hand sides EBNF right hand sides
SEQUENCE {u,v,x} uvx
CHOICE {u,v,x} u|v|x
u OPTIONAL u|ε
SET {u,v,x} uvx|uxv|vux|vxu|xuv|xvu
SEQUENCE OF u u∗
SET OF u u∗
SEQUENCE SIZE(1 .. MAX) OF u u+
SET SIZE(1 .. MAX) OF u u+
u(2 .. N) u2|u3| . . . |uN
ANY Arbitrary definition
ANY DEFINED BY u Arbitrary ASN.1 definition
parser enjoys worst-case linear space and time requirements in the length of input. Linear grammars are optimal
from a parsing standpoint, as it is possible to derive from them a parser which runs with constant memory and linear
time requirements in the length of input. Moreover, a parser for a REG language can be generated starting from the
definition of a regular expression [6].
We aim at obtaining a grammar definition for the X.509 language such that the parsing is decidable. In addition, we
require that such grammar is expressed as much as possible in terms of right-linear productions so that the parser
will only require a constant amount of memory (besides the one to contain the input). In the remainder of this work,
the terminal alphabet Vt will be the set of 256 values which can be taken by a byte, unless pointed out otherwise.
Each terminal symbol will be denoted by two hexadecimal digits (e.g., the byte taking the decimal value 42 will be
denoted as 2A). We will also employ the Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) to write the right hand sides of grammar
productions.
2.2 ASN.1 Overview
The ASN.1 meta-syntax was introduced by the ITU to specify structured data as abstract data types (ADTs), and it
is described in the set of ITU Recommendations (ITU-R) X.680-X.683 [22]. The encoding schemes for the ADTs
are specified in ITU-R X.690–X.696 [22]. The ASN.1 provides the means to express both the syntax of the ADT
at hand, in a form akin to a grammar, and some semantic constraints concerning the values taken by an instance of
such an ADT. As our systematic parsing strategy will rely on a parser generated from a grammar specification for
the X.509 ADT, we first provide a mapping between the syntactic-structure-specifying keywords of ASN.1 and the
corresponding productions of an EBNF grammar. Subsequently, we highlight how the remaining, non purely syntactic
features of ASN.1 act as constraints on the language of the instances of the described ADT in terms of semantics and
describe the meta-language facilities exposed to ease the definition of a non ambiguous specification.
Syntactic Elements.
An ASN.1 ADT can be regarded as a construct equivalent to a single EBNF grammar generating all the possible
concrete data type instances as its language. The user-defined name of the ADT corresponds to the axiom of the
EBNF grammar, while the productions are represented as structured data definitions with the ::= operator separating
the left and right hand side, in lieu of the common→.
The structure of an ADT may either be a single element, in case the type is primitive, or a composition of other types
employing ASN.1 constructs in case it is constructed.
Primitive types in ASN.1 represent terminal rules of an EBNF grammar, i.e., rules where α→β, α∈V+n , β∈V∗t .
The right hand side of a primitive type definition is described by a single line ended by a specific keyword (e.g.,
INTEGER, BOOLEAN, OBJECT IDENTIFIER, OCTET STRING, BIT STRING), specifying completely its nature. An
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OBJECT IDENTIFIER is a sequence of decimal numbers separated by dots, of which a single decimal number is
known as an arc.
Constructed types may either have a single user-defined name appearing on the right hand side of their definition,
in which case they act as the copy rules of an EBNF grammar (i.e., rules where α→β, α, β∈Vn), or an arbitrary
ASN.1 syntactic construct may be used. The only exception to the aforementioned constructed type definition is the
possibility of turning a primitive OCTET STRING or BIT STRING type into a constructed one through appending the
keyword CONTAINING to it, followed by the description of its contents. Deriving a constructed type from an OCTET
STRING forces its value in an ADT instance to be byte-aligned, and allows the designer to enforce the choice of the
encoding rules to be employed for it with the ENCODED BY keywords followed by the encoding name (see ITU-R
X.682) [22]. Table 1 shows a mapping between the ASN.1 structures appearing on the right hand side of the data types
which are considered in this work and their matching EBNF notation, expressed with a set of sample ASN.1 types
u,v,x and identically named strings u, v, x∈(Vt∪Vn)∗ in EBNF.
The ASN.1 notation specifies the common concatenation and alternative choice via the SEQUENCE and CHOICE key-
words, respectively, while the syntactic constraint indicated by the SET keyword mandates that a set of ADTs may
appear in any order, without repetitions. Postfixing an ADT appearing in a right hand side of a definition with the
OPTIONAL keyword allows it to be either missing or present only once. Given an ASN.1 ADT u, the syntactic con-
straints imposed by the SEQUENCE OF and SET OF constructs, indicate a concatenation of zero or more instances of
u, matching the star operator in EBNF. The ternary range operator in ASN.1, having the syntax t(low .. high),
where t is an ADT and low,high the range boundaries, is employed with two purposes: specifying the range of
possible values of the instances of the primitive ADT to which they are appended, or indicating the concatenation of
any number low<n<high of instances of the user-defined ADT preceding them. The bounds of a range operator are
either constant values or the keywords MIN and MAX, which indicate that the minimum (resp., maximum) of the given
range, is interpreted as the smallest (resp., greatest) value which can be taken by the ADT on their left. ASN.1 allows
to specify size constraints through the use of the keyword SIZE, followed by a range of allowed sizes. A common
idiom in ASN.1 ADT declarations is to employ MAX as an upper bound for SIZEs to indicate that there is no upper
bound on the size. As a consequence, the two common ASN.1 SEQUENCE SIZE(1 .. MAX) OF and SET SIZE(1
.. MAX) OF idioms in Table 1 are representing a concatenation of one or more instances of the involved ADT u,
corresponding to the EBNF cross construct. Finally, the ASN.1 keyword ANY allows to delegate the definition of
the structure of a given ADT to another document, potentially not expressed in ASN.1. Specifying further the effect
of the ANY construct with the DEFINED BY keywords, followed by the name of an ADT, enforces the fact that the
specification should be expressed in ASN.1.
Semantic Elements and Disambiguation Constructs.
ASN.1 allows to describe semantic information on instances of an ADT either specifying a constant value for a given
primitive type element, appending such value between round brackets on the line where the type appears, or specifying
a so-called DEFAULT value. Appending the DEFAULT keyword allows to indicate that, in case an element is missing
in an instance of the ADT, the recognizer should assume its presence nonetheless, and assign the semantic value
present in the ASN.1 specification to it. The expressive power of the ASN.1 allows the designer to specify an ADT
corresponding to an inherently ambiguous language, i.e., a language for which no unambiguous grammar exists. An
illustrative example of such a case is the following ADT t:
t ::= CHOICE {
s1 SEQUENCE{u(i..i),v(i..i),x(j..j)},
s2 SEQUENCE{u(j..j),v(i..i),x(i..i)}}
i ::= INTEGER 1 .. MAX
j ::= INTEGER 1 .. MAX
which has its instances belonging to the intrinsically ambiguous language L={uivixj ∨ ujvixi s.t.
u, v, x∈Vt, i≥1, j≥1}. To provide a convenient way to cope with ambiguities, ASN.1 introduces the so-called
user-defined tag elements. A tag is a syntactic element, denoted as a decimal number enclosed in square brackets,
which is prefixed to an ADT appearing in the right hand side of a data description. Proper use of tags minimally
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alters the language of accepted ADT instances, while effectively curbing ambiguities. The inherent ambiguity of the
sentences of the language of the previously shown ADT t can be eliminated adding two tags to its description:
t ::= CHOICE {
s1 SEQUENCE{ [0] u(i..i),v(i..i),x(j..j)},
s2 SEQUENCE{ [1] u(j..j),v(i..i),x(i..i)}}
i ::= INTEGER 1 .. MAX
j ::= INTEGER 1 .. MAX
It is worth noting that there is no algorithmic way to check whether a given set of tags introduced in an ASN.1
specification is enough to suppress all parsing ambiguities, as the expressive power of ASN.1 is sufficient to define a
generic CF grammar, for which determining if it is ambiguous is a well known undecidable problem [18].
2.3 Distinguished Encoding Rules
The encoding rules for an ASN.1 data type instance (see ITU-R X.690–X.696 [22]) define several formats portable
across different architectures by mandating bit and byte value conventions and ordering of the encoded contents. We
tackle the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), as a constructed typed field in the X.509 standard certificate ADT
requires its DER encoding via the ENCODED BY keyword. Consequentially, DER is the encoding rule employed in the
overwhelming majority of X.509 certificate instances found. DER encoded material may be further mapped to the
fully printable base64 encoding, resulting in the so-called Privacy-enhanced Electronic Mail (PEM) format [27]. The
DER encoding strategy represents an ASN.1 ADT instance as a stream of bytes which is logically split up into three
fields: identifier octets, length octets, contents octets.
The identifier octets field is employed to encode the ASN.1 tag value and whether the ADT instance at hand is a
primitive or a constructed ASN.1 type. The tag value may be either the disambiguating user-defined one present in the
ASN.1 ADT definition, or a so-called universal tag assigned by the DER standard to all ASN.1 primitive types and
to the SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE OF, SET, SET OF constructs. If a user-defined tag is present, its encoding is stored
in the identifier octets field, while the encoding of the tagged ADT is stored in the contents octets field. To provide a
more succinct encoding, ASN.1 allows to specify that a given user-defined tag is IMPLICIT, i.e., that it should replace
the tag of the tagged ADT in the encoding in the identifier octets field. On the other hand, the EXPLICIT keyword
states that a user-defined tag should be encoded according to the default behavior.
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCert TBSCertificate ,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
serialNumber CertSerialNumber ,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ,
issuer Name,
validity Validity ,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPubKeyInfo ,
issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueId OPTIONAL ,
subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueId OPTIONAL,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY AlgorithmP OPTIONAL}
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Figure 1: Portion of the description of the X.509 Certificate ADT and its fields
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The contents octets field contains the actual encoding of the ADT instance at hand, while the length octet one stores
the size of the content field as a number of bytes. The number of bytes constituting the length octets field varies in the
1 to 126 range. The encoding conventions for the length value are stated in the ITU-R X.690 [22]. A short form and a
long form for the encoding of a length value are possible. The short form mandates the encoding of the length field as
a single octet in which the most significant bit is 0 and the remaining ones encode the size of the contents octet field
from 0 to 127 bytes. The long form consists of one initial octet followed by one or more subsequent octets containing
the actual value of the length octet field. In the initial octet, the most significant bit is 1, while the remaining ones
encode the number of length field octets that follow as an integer varying from 1 to 126. Thus, the number of bytes
for the contents octet field is at most 2126·8. The length octet field value equal to 128 encoded as a single byte is
forbidden in DER, while in other standard encoding rules it is reserved to indicate that an indefinite number of bytes
will follow. It is worth noting that the requirement to validate correctly the information in the length octets field against
the actual length of the contents octets one can be done via a regular language matcher, as the lengths have an upper
bound. Nevertheless, the corresponding minimal finite state automaton (FSA) has a number of states which cannot be
represented (see Section 4).
2.4 Description of X.509 Certificate Structure
The structure of an X.509 certificate is described as an ASN.1 ADT in the ITU-R X.509 [21], and in the RFC 4210 [1]
and its complements [37, 19, 26, 8, 38, 10]. Its structure evolved over time, as its first version dates back to 1988. In
this section, we provide a synthetic description of its contents.
Certificate Abstract Data Type.
Figure 1 reports a shortened version of the X.509 standard, defining the main Certificate ADT. In the figure, field
names start with a lowercase letter, while ASN.1 user-defined ADT names start with capital letters. The Certificate
ADT is a concatenation of three fields: the material to be signed typed as TBSCertificate, the identification data
for the signature algorithm typed as AlgorithmIdentifier, and a BIT STRING field containing the actual signature
value.
TBSCertificate Abstract Data Type.
Considering the contents of the TBSCertificate ADT, the first two fields contain a version number typed as
Version (a value constrained INTEGER), and an integer value which must be unique among all the certificates
signed by the same certification authority (CA), which is typed as CertSerialNumber. The third field, typed as
an AlgorithmIdentifier, contains the information to uniquely identify the cryptographic primitive employed to
sign the certificate.
The AlgorithmIdentifier ADT is a concatenation of two fields: an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) typed
field algorithm and an optional parameters field, typed as ANY DEFINED BY AlgorithmP. The OID value allows to
uniquely label the signature algorithm to allow the description of the structure of its parameters, done in [37, 19, 26,
38, 10] for a set of standardized signature algorithms. The issuer, validity and subject fields contain information
on the CA issuing the certificate and the subject to whom it has been issued, together with the validity time interval of
the certificate. issuer and subject fields are typed as a Name ADT: a SEQUENCE OF of SET OF structures containing
a concatenation of two fields typed as OID and ANY, respectively. Despite the quite baroque definition, the Name ADT
is indeed employed to represent a list of names for both the issuer and the subject which are typically expressed as
printable strings prefixed with a standardized OID value stating their meaning (e.g., organization, state).
The subjectPublicKeyInfo field provides both the public key binded to the subject identity, and information on
the employed cryptographic primitive in the form of a BIT STRING and an AlgorithmIdentifier typed field,
respectively. Following the subjectPublicKeyInfo field, the TBSCertificate ADT includes two deprecated extra
optional fields, containing further information about the issuer and the subject. These fields are tagged with tags [1]
and [2] respectively, preventing a possible parsing ambiguity arising from only one of them being present.
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Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING CONTAINING ... ENCODED BY der }
Figure 2: X.509 ASN.1 description reporting the definition of the last field of the TBSCertificate ADT
Extension Abstract Data Type.
The extensions field concludes the definition of the TBSCertificate ADT. Most of the information of modern
certificates is contained in it, and its presence is mandatory in the current version (v3) of X.509 certificates. As reported
in Figure 2 the Extensions ADT is a sequence of one or more Extension typed fields. Each Extension ADT is
composed of an OID typed field identifying it unambiguously, and a critical field typed as BOOLEAN indicating, if
True, that the certificate validation should fail in case the application either does not recognize or cannot process the
information contained in the subsequent extnValue field. An example of information contained in the extnValue
field is the so-called KeyUsage, i.e., information stating which is the legitimate purpose of the subject public key in
the certificate at hand (e.g., signature validation or encryption).
3 Analysis of the X.509 Certificate Language
In this section, we analyze the X.509 certificate structure from a language theoretic standpoint. In particular, we
highlight the portions of the certificate which hinder and harden the design of a grammar amenable to automatic
parsing generation algorithms. These issues will be tackled in the next section, in order to achieve our goal of obtaining
an effective and decidable parser for X.509 digital certificates.
Undecidability of The Parsing.
Some portions of an X.509 certificate requires an unrestricted grammar in order to be generated, in turn implying
the parsing undecidability. First, consider the signature field in the TBSCertificate ADT, which is typed as an
AlgorithmIdentifier ADT. This is composed by an OID, identifying the signature algorithm, and by optional
parameters, whose structure depends on the OID. The complete freedom in the specification of the parameters
field via the ANY keyword of ASN.1 meta-syntax allows the description to be arbitrarily complex, in particular allowing
natural language constraints to be specified on eventual fields of parameters. This, in turn, requires an unrestricted
grammar to generate the language and results in the undecidability of the certificate parsing. A similar issue arises in
extnValue field of the Extension ADT. This field is typed as an OCTET STRING and is turned into a constructed
type by the keyword CONTAINING (see Section 2.2). The specific structure of the extnValue field depends on the
value of the extnID field, which is an OID identifying the extension type. The standard allows the definition of custom
extensions, which may specify an arbitrary content for it [21]. Such a lack of constraints allows the checks on this
content to be arbitrary complex, i.e., representable by an unrestricted grammar.
Context-Sensitiveness.
Some portions of X.509 certificate structure cannot be generated by a context-free grammar, in turn implying that for
these portions an efficient automatically generated parser cannot be derived. The context-sensitiveness is introduced
by the same kind of constraint in 2 different portions of the certificates. This constraint is the need to check repetitions
of arbitrarily long strings. First, consider the signatureAlgorithm field in Certificate ADT and the signature
field in TBSCertificate ADT, both typed as AlgorithmIdentifier. While the latter is found in the portion of the
certificate which is signed, the former is not. Therefore, it is expected that these 2 fields have the same content, in
turn requiring a Context-Sensitive (CS) recognizer to check this equality. Similarly, some portions of the certificate
must be present if the certificate is self-issued, which means that the issuer and the subject are the same entity. Recall
that both issuer and subject are typed as Name ADT, which is an arbitrarily long sequence of names, which are
generally printable strings, referring to the issuer or subject entity, coupled with an OID identifying their meaning.
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Verifying if a certificate is self-issued or not requires to match the content of issuer and subject fields, which are
arbitrarily long string of bytes.
Parsing Ambiguities and Inconsistencies.
Due to looseness in standard specification of some fields, there are also parsing ambiguities in the format. First,
consider the signatureValue field in the Certificate ADT. Despite the X.509 standard is typing this field as a
primitive BIT STRING, some standardized signature algorithms require it to be a constructed field (e.g., the DSA and
ECDSA cryptographic primitives [38, 10]), in turn giving way to an ambiguity in its interpretation. The same kind
of issue arises in SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in TBSCertificate ADT. Indeed, the public key field is typed as
a BIT STRING, instead of a constructed ADT. These ambiguities may lead to security issues when parameters for a
given cryptographic primitive are either misinterpreted as valid for another one or simply parsed incorrectly [12, 2]. A
further issue is introduced by the extnValue field in Extension ADT, which is typed as OCTET STRING but contains
the extension data, which is usually a constructed ADT. Nevertheless, DER forbids the encoding of OCTET STRINGS
as constructed types (see ITU-R X.690) [22], in turn forcing an inconsistency in the way OCTET STRINGS containing
the value of an extnValue field should be treated during parsing (due to the CONTAINING keyword in the X.509
specification). We note that a less problematic definition of the field would have involved a dedicated constructed
ADT for the extnValue field, which should have had its structure specified according to the value of the extnID
field.
Unmanageable Number of Rules.
Recall that the Extensions ADT is a sequence of Extension ADTs. Such a sequence of ADTs has no constraint
on their order, as they all share the same ADT. However, a constraint expressed in natural language in the X.509 stan-
dard mandates that 2 Extension typed field instances with the same extnID field cannot appear, in turn providing
a concrete hindrance to its representation in grammar form. Indeed, an exponential number of productions would be
required to generate unique Extension instances in any possible order. Considering that the number of X.509 stan-
dardized extensions is 17 [21], the required grammar would have at least 217 productions, which is hardly manageable
by a designer.
3.1 Summing Up Hindrances to X.509 Parsing
In the following statements we provide a synthesis of the undecidability, context sensitiveness and ambiguity problems
arising from the X.509 certificate standard and recall the issue about the size of the grammar representation reported
in Section 2.3.
Statement 1. (UNDECIDABILITY CONTEXT SENSITIVENESS AND AMBIGUITY) The following issues should be
tackled lest no unambiguous, correct parsing of X.509 is possible:
i) Cope with the undecidability arising from the potential definition of arbitrary structures for both the AlgorithmP
ADT in the right-hand side of the AlgorithmIdentifier ADT and the value of the extnValue field in the
right-hand side of Extension ADT, without requiring an unrestricted grammar to specify them.
ii) Cope with the context sensitiveness of the X.509 grammar, arising from the equality checks required on the
signature field of the TBSCertificate ADT against the signatureAlgorithm field of Certificate
ADT, and the need to match arbitrarily long subject and issuer fields of the TBSCertificate ADT.
iii) Cope with the ambiguity introduced by the definition of the extnValue field as a constructed OCTET STRING,
while its encoding is forced to mark it as a primitive one. Similarly cope with the issue of the
signatureValue field and the subjectPublicKey field where information represented as a constructed
data type is encoded as a primitive BIT STRING.
In addition to the aforementioned issues, some of the portions of the X.509 language which can be defined with a
linear grammar are still unpractical to be fully specified.
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Statement 2. (UNMANAGEABLE GRAMMAR REPRESENTATION) The presence of uniqueness constraints among the
instances of the Extension ADT standardized in [8] can only be expressed with a linear grammar having >217
productions.
We consider the aforementioned issues to be among the main causes of the current approach to X.509 parsing, which
sees fully handcrafted implementations of the parser as an alternative to the development of an automatically generated
one. However, given the complexity of the X.509 certificate standard specification, and the impossibility of method-
ically checking the correctness of a human-implemented recognizer (due to context-sensitive portions of the X.509
language), the current state-of-the-art parser implementations are exhibiting a non-trivial amount of security critical
errors in the recognition of X.509 sentences [29, 30, 23].
4 Systematic X.509 Parsing
In this section we describe our approach to realize an automatically generated X.509 parser, starting from a grammar
description. The obtained parser enjoys termination guarantees, correctness and a worst-case computational complex-
ity which is quadratic in the length of the certificate.
We strive to minimize the non-regular portion of X.509 language, allowing an efficient parser to be systematically
generated. However, since it is not possible to turn X.509 into a regular language without either significant precision
loss in recognition, or substantial functionality loss in the parser, we retain a small CS portion of its description. Such
a CS portion, indeed made of two binary string equality checks and a single boolean condition, is implemented by
hand, as relying on the generic CS parsing algorithm would entail an exponential running time even for such rather
trivial operations.
4.1 Coping with Undecidability, Context Sensitiveness and Ambiguity
The first step to obtain a useful grammar description of the X.509 standard is to cope with its parsing undecidability
problem. We restricted the AlgorithmIdentifier ADT descriptions to the ones which are explicitly and fully
described in the standards [37, 19, 26, 10, 38]. As a consequence we remove the possibility of having an unrestricted
syntactic structure of their fields allowed by the ASN.1 keyword ANY in the standard. This decision implies that we will
recognize certificates employing only algorithms for which a standardized AlgorithmIdentifier description exists,
which is typically a sign of wide acceptance of the cryptographic security margin offered by them. Examining all the
standardized AlgorithmIdentifier descriptions we note that their structures are described by regular languages.
This restriction may prevent correct recognition of valid X.509 certificates found in the wild. During our practical
evaluation campaign, we observed just a negligible percentage of certificates being affected by this restriction, as
detailed in Section 5. We tackled the similar problem caused by the ANY-typed extnValue field by parsing the
syntactic structure of all the standard defined extensions [8] strictly.
However, in contrast with the decision taken for the non standard AlgorithmIdentifier structures, we accept user-
defined extensions, considering them opaque byte sequences, and performing only a syntactic check on the correctness
of the OID field and the length of the unspecified structure field. Indeed, in case of a custom extension for which the
Boolean critical field is set, a validation failure must be signaled by the application logic, in case it is not able to
handle the contents of the extnValue field [21]. Taking into account the described restrictions, the resulting X.509
specification is a CS language LX.509−r1 where the string membership problem is decidable.
The second step in producing a grammar description of X.509 is to tackle its context-sensitiveness. To this end, we
consider the language LX.509−r1 as the intersection of three languages LX.509−r1 = LAId−match ∩LSI−match ∩LCF,
where LAId−match is the language containing sentences with two matching AlgorithmIdentifier type instances,
LSI−match is the one where whenever the certificate subject and issuer match, the keyIdentifier field of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension ADT should be present, and LCF is the CF language where all the remaining
X.509 linguistic constraints are holding on the sentences. Thus, parsingLX.509−r1 can be done analyzing the candidate
string (i.e., a certificate instance) with three parsers, each one recognizing one of the three aforementioned languages.
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We choose to start with the parser ACF for LCF, as it can be automatically generated from its grammar description.
The parse tree produced by ACF is then employed by a handwritten string matcher, which checks the conditions
required for a string to belong both to LAId−match and to LSI−match. The code auditing of such a simple handwritten
string matcher can be confidently performed by direct inspection to check its correctness. Indeed, these pieces of
code are small and definitely simpler than a full hand-written parser, dramatically decreasing the complexity of the
code auditing process. Therefore, spotting any vulnerabilities in these hand-written parsers is expected to be easier.
Finally, we remark that this code has no influence on the automatic generated parser for ACF, since these matchings
are performed when the parse tree for ACF has already been built. Consequently, it is not possible that a subtle
vulnerability in this code affects the correctness of the ACF parser.
The last step to achieve unambiguous, decidable recognition of the X.509 certificates is to cope with the ambigu-
ity issues stemming from the primitive encoding forced by DER on constructed OCTET STRINGs in the extnValue
field and the BIT STRINGs containing signature and public key material specified by the standard to be primitive.
Concerning the issue of the extnValue field, we choose to eliminate the ambiguity relying on the fact that the stan-
dards define the contents of the constructed type binding it to a specific OID: this in turn allows to parse unambigu-
ously an ADT instance. Concerning the BIT STRING fields, we eliminate the parsing ambiguity recognizing them
as constructed or primitive types according to the individual cryptographic primitive needs as specified in the stan-
dards [37, 19, 26, 10, 38]. Such an approach will indeed pick only a single way of interpreting the data contained in
the field, preventing security critical parsing issues such as the ones in [2].
Once such ambiguities are removed from LCF, the resulting language is indeed regular and will be denoted as LREG
from now on, while the resulting restricted X.509 language will be denoted as LX.509−r2=LAId−match ∩LSI−match ∩
LREG.
Lemma 1. The proposed parser for LX.509−r2 terminates on any input string.
Proof. Since LX.509−r2=LAId−match ∩LSI−match ∩LREG is the result of the intersection of two CS languages and a
REG language, the closure property of the CS family w.r.t. set intersection implies that LX.509−r2 is CS, a necessary
condition for the termination of its parsing process. To prove the termination guarantee of the proposed parser, it is
sufficient to observe that all the three parsers, sequentially executed to recognize LX.509−r2, have guarantees on their
termination, namely: the parser for LREG is a FSA, while the string matchers act on arbitrarily large, but not infinite
strings.
Lemma 2. LX.509−r2 is non intrinsically ambiguous, and all its sentences can be parsed unambiguously.
Proof. The only source of ambiguity in the original X.509 specification is the one caused by interpretation issues of
the X.509 standard, which are no longer present in LX.509−r2. The first stage of the proposed parser matches the
sentences of LX.509−r2=((LREG ∩ LAId−match) ∩ LSI−match) by means of a deterministic finite state recognizer,
which can only have a single recognition path for each one of them. The CS recognizer stages simply discard some of
the strings deemed valid by the first stage, and thus do not introduce ambiguity.
4.2 Managing Grammar Representation and Recognizer Generation
Having dealt with the linguistic issues which could either have prevented the parsing (i.e., the undecidability) or
made its result unusable (i.e., the ambiguity), we now tackle the issues concerning the practical construction of a
grammar representation for X.509 and the generation of its recognizer. Among the recognizers required to match
LX.509−r2=((LREG ∩LAId−match)∩LSI−match) the last two suffer from no issues either in their syntax definition or
in their recognizer generation.
In order to tackle the issues coming from Statement 2 in Section 3.1, we consider LREG as the intersection of three
regular languages: LREG = LREG−1 ∩ LREG−2 ∩ LREG−3. LREG−1 is the language of byte strings containing
sequences of Extensions instances where each Extension instance appears at most once, LREG−2 is the language
of DER encoded ASN.1 fields with the correct constraints holding between the length octet field and the contents
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Figure 3: Strawman example of finite state recognizer accepting strings of a characters appended to their lengths
expressed as two radix-4 digits. The initial state q0 accepts the first digit, and memorizes it by means of the finite state
memory, and moves to one of the four si states, which in turn read the second digit of the length and transition to an ri
state. ri states are linked by a countdown chain of transitions, where i indicates the amount of remaining a characters
to be recognized before acceptance
octets field, and LREG−3 contains all the remaining regular constraints to obtain a sentence in LREG when considered
in intersection with LREG−1 and LREG−2.
A straightforward definition of LREG−1 with a linear grammar requires 17! rules, a number which can be reduced to
a little over 217 through careful rewriting. We deem this number of productions too high to be described and checked
reliably, thus we match a relaxation of LREG−1 at first, which allows the Extensions to be duplicated, and perform
a subsequent uniqueness check on the result of the parsing action. This choice allows us to retain the description of
the structure of the individual Extension instance as a purely syntactic one, and perform the check for duplicates on
their parsed OID fields. We implemented the duplicate checking logic as an handwritten portion of our parser, as we
deem the code to be small and simple enough to allow effective code auditing of it.
Providing an effective and efficient grammar definition for LREG−2 is similarly difficult. Indeed, it is enough to
consider a simpler but structurally equivalent languageLREG−2−P, where only the length constraints on DER encoded
ASN.1 primitive types are enforced, to obtain an unmanageable number of productions. LREG−2−P is composed of
strings of the form lv, where l is a byte string containing a unique encoding of a length in [0, 2126·8] and v a string
of arbitrary bytes with the given length. A straightforward grammar representation of it requires at least a grammar
production for each valid value of the byte string l. Such a number of productions is well beyond the realm of feasibility
in realization. The first observation concerning this issue is that the possible values taken by the l string in practice will
be significantly less than the possible ones, as the sensible lengths for an X.509 certificate are typically far smaller than
2126·8B. As a consequence, we deemed reasonable to restrict the set of valid represented lengths (both in LREG−2−P
and inLREG−2) to the [0, 232−1] interval, which entails accepting certificates of size up to 4 Gib. Note that, restricting
further the encoded length values to a number which allows handwriting of the corresponding linear grammar by a
human designer (i.e., in the hundreds range at most) would critically reduce the usefulness of the parser, as it would
be able to match only contents smaller than a couple of hundreds bytes. We chose the aforementioned conservative
upper bound of 232 to prevent a parser that preallocates memory for the contents of the soon-to-be-recognized string in
advance from being subject to easy Denial-of-Service attacks, via incorrect certificates overstating their lengths. Since
the bound imposed by the practical usefulness on the number of rules of the grammar is still insufficient to allow a
manageable specification of the grammar itself, we resort to analyze the parser automaton of LREG−2−P to derive a
more manageable implementation of the recognizer, and adapt it to recognize the entire LREG−2.
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To illustrate how the problem of implementing the recognizer for LREG−2−P is solved in practice, we first provide a
toy example, recognizing the language of words lv, where the content length l is expressed by two, radix-4 digits, and
is followed by the content v which is a sequence of a.
The toy Finite State Automaton (FSA) recognizer operating on the set of bytes Σ = {0, 1, 2, 3, a} is defined as
AREG−2−P : (Σ,Q, δ, q0,F), where Q is the set of states of the automaton, q0 the initial state, F the set of final
states, and δ : Q×Σ→Q the transition function. A depiction of the recognizer FSA is provided in Figure 3. The key
idea underlying its functioning is count the a symbols in v employing a chain of states, of which only the last is an
accepting one (depicted in figure as ri, i ∈ [0, 15]). The recognition of the length l is performed while decoding which
one is the state of the chain of counting states where the computation should start recognizing the content v. The
decoding is performed memorizing the number read digit by digit, yielding a single sequence of transitions starting
from the initial state q0 and ending in a counting state for each one of the latter.
The main issue in implementing an automaton with the structure depicted in Figure 3 is to provide a way to imple-
ment the transition function δ different from the common tabulated form, which would require an amount of space
proportional to the maximum length of the represented string multiplied by the alphabet size; i.e., a number of entries
≥ 232·256 for the recognizer of AREG−2−P.
Our approach to cope with this issue is to employ a computational form of the said δ, where the states are encoded as
unsigned integers, and the destination state can be computed in closed form. In the toy example, the δ function, which
has its description as δ(q0, t) = st, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}; δ(si, t) = r4i+t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}; δ(ri, t) = ri−1, t = a, i ∈
[1, 15], can be transformed in computational form encoding the ri states with the unsigned integer i, the si states with
24 + i and q0 as 25, and computing it as
δ(q0, t) = st, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} → δ(q, t) = 24 + t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, q = 25
δ(si, t) = r4i+t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} → δ(q, t) = (q − 24) · 4 + t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, q = 24 + i, i ∈ [0, 3]
δ(ri, t) = ri−1, i ∈ [1, 15] → δ(i, t) = i− 1, t = a, i ∈ [1, 15]
Following the same line of reasoning employed to obtain a computational form for the delta of our toy example
automaton, we devised the representation of the transition function for the recognizer AREG−2−P. In particular, such
a length function deals with the possible variable length encoding of the length field dedicating a specific transition
path for each one of the lengths:
δ(q0, a) =

a with 0≤ a≤127
232 with a=129
233 with a=130
234 with a=131
235 with a=132
This split in the parsing paths also allows us to encode in the state the actual value of the length counter, accumulating
it in case it is longer than a single byte. All the length-field recognition paths terminate with a transition moving to
the state encoding the corresponding number of content octets field bytes to be read, upon reading the last byte of the
length field, following the same structure of the toy automaton. Such a transition function is shown in Figure 4.
Finally, the remaining portion of the transition function takes care of counting the content octet field bytes while they
are being read simply decrementing the counter encoded in the state as ∀ a∈Vt, δ(q, a)=q−1 with 1≤ q≤232−1 until
the only final state of the automaton F={0} is reached. All the unspecified transitions are leading to the error state.
This δ can be conveniently implemented in any programming language employing a single 64-bit unsigned integer as
storage for the current state.
In order to recognize LREG−2 to its full extent, we build on AREG−2−P a machine able to take into account ASN.1
constructed types. Since the content of a constructed type is a list of other ASN.1 types, a nesting structure is in-
troduced, requiring different counters depending on the nesting level. In our case, it is still possible to do so, while
still employing a FSA recognizer as the maximum nesting depth is bounded, as a consequence of the capping im-
posed on the value of the outermost counter. As a consequence, we represent the state of AREG−2 as a vector of
states of AREG−2−P, employing one for each nesting level, and transitioning from one to the other upon recognizing
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∀ a ∈ Vt,
0 ≤ i ≤ 255 δ(q, a) =

a with q=232, 128≤a≤255
233+a+1 with q=233
a+(q−(233+1))·28 with q=δ(233, i)
234+1+a with q=234
234+1+a+(q−234−1)·28 with q=δ(234, i)
a+(q−234−1)·28 with q=δ(δ(234, i), i)
235+1+a with q=235
235+1+a+(q−235−1)·28 with q=δ(235, i)
235+1+a+(q−235−1)·28 with q=δ(δ(235, i), i)
a+(q−235−1)·28 with q=δ(δ(δ(235, i), i), i)
Figure 4: Transition function for the recognizer AREG−2−P
the beginning and end of a constructed type. It is thus possible to implement the recognizer FSA for LREG taking
care of performing the product among the automata AREG−1, AREG−2 and AREG−3 employing any parser generator
allowing to do so (e.g., multistate lexers in GNU Flex [36], or predicate grammars in ANTLR [34]).
4.3 Recognizer Implementation
Willing to implement the proposed recognizer by means of a tool generating the actual code from a synthetic-grammar
based description of the LX.509−r2 language, we choose the formalism of predicated grammars [35] which can be
employed as an input to the ANTLR parser generator to obtain an efficient LL(*) parser [34]. The LL(*) grammars
are obtained as an extension of the common subset of the DCF grammars known as LL(k) grammars, i.e., the ones
amenable to recursive descent parsing without backtracking [18]. Our choice of an LL(*) predicated grammar is
justified by the expressiveness of the formalism, which allows us to combine the computational implementations of
the transition functions of the length validating automatonAREG−2, together with the two CS checks and the generated
portion of the parser via the so-called semantic predicates. We note that, although it is possible in principle to provide
an equally functional description of the X.509 employing a GNU Flex generated parser, exploiting the multi-state lexer
functionality to combine the different transition functions and through a generous use of the semantic actions, such
a description is less manageable as it would be made of a huge regular expression defining LREG. Moreover, LL(*)
parsers inherit from LL(k) ones the capability of providing a useful syntax error reporting, which is useful to diagnose
the nature of certificate faults.
Predicated grammars are defined as augmented LL(k) grammars adding to the usual quadruple (see Section 2) G :
(Vt,Vn,P, S,Π,M) two sets: the set of side-effect free semantic predicates Π and the set of mutators M. Semantic
predicates are employed as a prefix to the right hand side of a production, so that such a production is considered
during the corresponding recursive descent parsing action only if the predicate evaluated on the state of the parser
is true [35]. Mutators are the way predicated grammars formalize semantic actions acting on the state of the parser,
which should be taken upon the matching of the right hand side of a rule [34].
The parser generation process of ANTLR produces a modified recursive descent LL parser, where in lieu of the
common sets of finite-length lookaheads the decisions are taken relying on the fact that the language of the lookaheads
(i.e., the language of the suffixes of the strings) can be split into a regular partition. This allows the LL(*) parser to
employ FSAs to recognize the lookaheads, effectively enhancing its recognition power, although at the possible cost
of examining the entire remainder of the string for each decision to be taken. Therefore, while this tends to happen
quite rarely, it is possible for a parsing action to take quadratic time in the size of the input.
In case the input grammar cannot be recognized by an LL(*) automaton, ANTLR falls back to an exponential-time
backtracking based strategy for the generated parser. ANTLR also supports semantic actions to manipulate the results
of the parsing action, after a successful match of the right hand side of a rule, in the same style as GNU Flex [36] and
GNU Bison [9].
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We implemented the recognizer described in the previous sections, employing semantic actions to perform the CS
checks required to match LAId−match and LSI−match, introducing them as soon as the portion of the parse tree
matched contains the required information. The implementation of the δ functions for AREG−1 and AREG−2 FSAs
and the product with the FSA portion of the LL(*) matcher automaton are performed exploiting semantic predicates
for AREG−2 with the aim to forbid the transitions which would be valid according to the matcher of AREG−3 alone,
and performing the uniqueness check for AREG−1 in an appropriate semantic action, upon matching of the required
portion of the parse tree. We also employed semantic predicates to obtain an efficient implementation of the choice
of the recognition path in the parser, when we employed the value of the OIDs to disambiguate whether an OCTET
STRING contained in an extnValue field of the Extension ADT is indeed composite or primitive as described in
Section 4.1. The same strategy was applied to disambiguate BIT STRING encodings in the subjectPublicKeyInfo
and the signatureValue fields. The recognizer generation process of ANTLR confirmed that no fallback to the
backtracking based parser is made, and that the grammar is indeed LL(*) and non ambiguous.
LL(*) parsers achieve the same correctness guarantees of classical automatically generated parsers: that is, they rec-
ognize the same language generated by the grammar from which the parser was derived. Therefore, we can claim our
parser is correct, given that the grammar specification is compliant with the standard [8]. We validate the compliance
of the grammar we propose by classifying the parsing errors reported, exploiting the accurate information obtainable
with an LL(*) recognizer, and by manually inspecting the certificate to verify that there is actually the syntactic failure
reported by our parser. We are able to report that no syntactic error detected by other libraries escapes our parser on
the entire corpus of 11M X.509 certificates in use for TLS.
5 Experimental evaluation
We conduct an experimental campaign to validate the effectiveness of our parser against a comprehensive certificate
set and to compare it to the recognition capabilities of 7 different TLS libraries chosen among the most widely used
in securing HTTPS transactions. Our systematically generated parser allowed us to discover a significant amount of
parsing errors, among which security critical issues are present. We validate such a criticality showing how one of
the parsing flaws allows a common user owning a leaf certificate to act as a CA, effectively forging valid and trusted
certificates for any subject. Differently from the aforementioned TLS libraries, our analysis does not perform any
semantic check on the values of the fields of the considered X.509 certificates, as it is out of the scope of this work.
Experimental Settings and Libraries.
In our experimental campaign we generated the LL(*) recognizer employing the C backend of ANTLR [20] version
3.5.1, as no backends for statically compiled languages are available in the most recent ANTLR v4. The choice of
employing the C backend in ANTLR was made to allow an easier future integration of the generated parser within
the most common programs employing TLS libraries, and to provide a parser implementation with good parsing
performance.
We compare our parser against the following libraries: OpenSSL (v1.0.2g) [33], which is employed in both the Apache
and NGINX web server SSL/TLS modules; BoringSSL (commit: ef7dba6ac, 2016-01-26) [17], the fork of OpenSSL
re-engineered by Google and used as default TLS library in Chrome, Chromium and Android system binaries;
GNUTLS (v3.3.17) [15], the Free Software Foundation TLS library employed in the GNOME desktop environment fa-
cilities and the Common Unix Printing System (CUPS); Network Security Services (NSS) (v3.22.2 Basic ECC) [32],
the TLS implementation of the Mozilla Foundation employed in Firefox; SecureTransport (v57031.1.35) [3] and
CryptoAPI (v10.0.105 86.0) [31], the proprietary implementations of TLS by Apple and Microsoft respectively, em-
ployed for OS updates by both of them; and BouncyCastle (v1.54), the default security provider in Android apps
since v2.1 [14]. These libraries cover the overwhelming majority of the employed TLS providers: while other ones
are available, they are either employed in more restricted application scenarios, or are obtained as a fork of one of
the analyzed libraries, without changing the X.509 parsing logic (e.g., LibreSSL, Amazon s2n). For each one of the
chosen libraries we realized a minimal client able to process and validate an X.509 certificate given its certification
path.
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Figure 5: Differential chain analysis approach employed to prevent errors taking place in an intermediate certificate
of a chain from overshadowing others. Sub-figure (a) reports two samples of certificate chains, the first having as leaf
C3, the second one having its CA, C2 as leaf. Sub-figure (b) reports a summary of the validation outcome assigned to
the leaf certificate of a chain, according to the validity reported by a library on both the chain terminating with it, and
the one terminating with its CA
We ran all the validators, including our parser, on a Linux Gentoo 13.0 amd64 host based on a six-core Intel Xeon
E5-2603v3 endowed with 32 GiB DDR-4 DRAM, save for the CryptoAPI and SecureTransport clients, which were
run on a Windows 10 machine, equipped with Intel i7 2600, 3.4 GHz 64-bit processor and 8 GiB DDR-3 DRAM,
hosting a VMWare virtual machine running Mac OSX 10.10 Yosemite with 5.3 GiB RAM. We stored the results of
the validation by all the recognizers in a MySQL database, together with base64 encoded DER certificates to ease the
processing.
We choose as our dataset the one provided by the Internet-Wide Scan Data Repository [13] obtained as a result of a
scan of the entire IPv4 address space on TCP port 443 on the 17th of December 2016, which encompasses 10, 999, 727
X.509 digital certificates employed to secure HTTPS connections. A statistical analysis of the certificates shows that
their sizes are in [0.31, 31.5] kiB, with an average of 1.41 kiB and a standard deviation of 0.46 kiB.
All the validation operations were made indicating the date of the certificate collection as the current one to the
TLS library to avoid unwanted certificate rejections due to expiration. To the end of providing a fair comparison on
the syntactic error recognition capabilities of the existing libraries on a single certificate we need to cope with their
choices in terms of user interface. First of all, the existing libraries provide two different procedures, one to parse
the certificate and retrieve the information stored, and another one which actually performs the validation of such
information (e.g., checks signatures, checks expiration date) and builds its certification path. However, according to
the errors reported by the two routines, it is quite evident that the syntactic error recognition is distributed between
both of them. Consequentially, to provide a comparison of the complete syntactic detection capabilities of the libraries,
we are forced to run also some or all of their semantic checks on the certificate, and its certification path, employing
the validation procedure. To allow a comparison with our approach, we analyze the errors raised by these routines for
each library, and we classify them in three categories:
• syntactic, which are related to a structural error of the certificate (e.g., Duplicate Extensions Not
Allowed reported by Bouncy Castle). These are the relevant errors for the comparison with our parser;
• validation, which are related to the content of the certificate or to the certification path building (e.g., Cert
Expired in GNUTLS or Unable to Get Issuer Certificate in OpenSSL). These are not relevant er-
rors for the comparison with our parser, since they are out of its scope;
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Table 2: Classification of parsing outcomes for the 10, 999, 727 X.509 certificates stored in the Internet-Wide Scan
Data Repository (U. Michigan), obtained from the differential analysis of 19, 024, 812 certificate chains
Library
No. of Accepted No. of Rejected Certificates
Certificates Syntactic Validation GenericRejections Rejections Rejections
OpenSSL [33] (OpenSSL Foundation) 3, 656, 634 70 7, 342, 978 45
BoringSSL [17] (Google Inc.) 3, 656, 906 70 7, 342, 706 45
GNUTLS [15] (Free Software Foundation) 4, 686, 475 4, 545 6, 308, 691 16
NSS [32] (Mozilla Foundation) 3, 457, 412 33 7, 520, 844 21, 436
SecureTransport [3] (Apple Inc.) 3, 574, 491 0 7, 389, 531 35, 705
CryptoAPI [31](Microsoft Corporation) 4, 197, 421 591 6, 801, 687 28
BouncyCastle [25] (Legion of Bouncy Castle) 4, 159, 585 5, 795 6, 723, 630 110, 724
our systematic parser 8, 638, 063 2, 361, 664 – –
• generic, which are errors whose description is too loose to understand the issue they refer to, hardening the
classification in one of the 2 previous categories (e.g., the kSecTrustResultInvalid error code reported
by Apple Secure Transport). We cannot relate these errors to our parser due to this lack of information on
their source.
We provide our classification of the errors reported by all the libraries in Appendix A, Table A.1. A second point of the
validation process of the libraries which we must cope with is that they provide a single answer for the validation of an
entire certification path. While this is correct in terms of compliance to the TLS standard behavior, where a certificate
is invalid if any of the ones composing its certification path fails validation, this behavior results in an incorrect parent
certificate shadowing with its errors the potential correctness of the certificates for which it acts as a CA. In order
to have a clearer insight of the extent of such a behavior we also report an ancillary set of results on the certificate
correctness derived via a differential analysis strategy, of which the gist is reported in Figure 5.
The main idea of such a strategy is that if an error pertains to a certificate in a certification path, then the error disappears
if the certificate is no longer in the path, and this fact can be used as a detection strategy. The differential analysis starts
from validating all the possible certification paths, both the ones having an actual leaf certificate as the last one (C3,
in Figure 5(a)), and all the ones having its CAs as the last certificate in the path (C2, in Figure 5(a)). The results are
stored, and the leaf certificate is deemed valid or invalid according to the policy reported in Figure 5(b). In particular,
a certificate is deemed invalid only if the error reported for the chain ending with it differs from the one reported for
the chain ending with its CA. In case the errors reported for a certificate and its CA during the chain validation by
a library match, the leaf certificate is deemed valid (see the two outcomes highlighted in blue in Figure 5(b)), as the
differential analysis considers the match in errors as an overshadowing effect of the error in the CA certificate, which
in turn causes an early exit in the validation procedure. The only precision penalty paid in this process is to deem a
leaf certificate valid in case it is actually affected by the same error as its CAs, which is not expected to be a common
case, given the significant variety of possible errors.
However, given the tight interleaving of syntactic and semantic checks in validation routines performed by the tested
libraries, and the need to feed such routines with the whole certification path, we claim that no further information
can be obtained unless a substantial re-engineering of the codebase of each library (when available) is performed.
We remark that the practice of interleaving syntactic (input) validation and semantics, while being profitable from a
performance standpoint, was identified as a pitfall from a security standpoint, since complex validation checks, which
are more prone to vulnerabilities, may affect the parsing process. Indeed, rejecting the certificates upon parsing alone
reduces the attack surface of the TLS/SSL libraries, as it does not expose internal calls to un-sanitized input.
Health State of the X.509 Certificate Set.
For each one of the considered libraries, Table 2 reports the outcome of the differential analysis of the 19, 024, 812
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Figure 6: Syntactic errors recognized by our parser (2, 361, 664). The bars shows the number of certificates suffering
from: MISSING keyIdentifier IN NOT SELF-ISSUED CERT; BAD DNS/URI/EMAIL; MISSING
subjectKeyId; keyUsage VIOLATION ON PK ALGORITHM includes 41 different kinds of errors
certification paths and sub-chains included in the dataset. We note that only 31%–43% of the entire set is deemed valid
by any one of the considered libraries, which in turn discard the overwhelming majority of the rejected certificates on
the basis of validation error in their contents (e.g., invalid signature). Syntax errors are indeed composing a negligible
part of the causes for rejection over the whole set of certificates (at most ≈ 0.05%), confirming the concerns on the
soundness of the parsing actions of the libraries. We note that, due to the interleaving of the syntactic and semantic
checking in common libraries, there is no way to understand which and how many syntax checks have been run when
the semantic validation takes place. As a consequence, for the certificates deemed semantically invalid, we cannot
provide a more precise comparison purely between the syntax checks of our parser and the ones in the libraries. A
further tiny portion of the certificates (at most ≈ 1.6%) is rejected by the libraries with errors named as generic.
By contrast, our systematically generated parser recognizes 78.5% of certificates as syntactically X.509 abiding and,
most interestingly, is able to discard 21.5% of the whole set of 10, 999, 727 certificates via an appropriate language
analysis only. Such a result provides strong evidence supporting a precise parsing action before the contents of the
certificate are employed to perform validation.
Exploiting the accurate error reporting allowed by LL(*) parsers, we classified the syntactic issues found. Figure 6
reports errors found by our parser among the 2, 361, 664 certificates deemed syntactically invalid. As shown, only 4
errors are covering about 84% of the rejected certificates, that are: MISSING keyIdentifier IN NOT SELF-ISSUED
CERT, BAD DNS/URI/EMAIL, MISSING subjectKeyId, and keyUsage VIOLATION ON PK ALGORITHM.
Among these errors, the first and the third most frequent ones are not security critical, since they report missing fields
which are required in order to help certification path building, thus the worst outcome may be a chain building error.
By contrast, the second and fourth most frequent errors can be a source of security issues. In particular, malformed
DNS, URI or email addresses may be exploited for malicious purposes by generating a malformed string which is
actually deemed valid but interpreted differently by two implementations. Practical impersonation attacks exploiting
differences in the interpretation of the same string among different implementations were proven a realistic threat
in [23].
Concerning the fourth most common flaw in the certificates, violations in the keyUsage policy, it allows a public key
to be employed in a cryptographic operation the corresponding primitive is not designed for (e.g., a Diffie-Hellman
public key employed to check digital signatures), with unpredictable and potentially harmful consequences.
We remark our parser identifies 45 different errors on the dataset, showing a high variety of syntactical issues in
the certificates analyzed, and a highly specialized error recognition capability. Among these different errors, one of
them refers to the presence of an AlgorithmIdentifier ADT with an unrecognized algorithm OID. Recall that we
impose this restriction on our grammar both to get rid of undecidable portions of the language, as well as relying only
on standardized algorithm, which have generally undergone an higher level of scrutiny. We determined that such a
restriction affects only 23, 427 certificates, that is, 0.2% of the dataset. We thus consider such a restriction acceptable
in our implementation, especially considering that additional AlgorithmIdentifiers may be added to the parser by
an implementor who has specific needs – e.g., maintenance reasons arising from the fact that the ITU or one of its
authorized subsidiaries approved a supplementary (non-standard) algorithm identifier value.
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Table 3: Sub-table (a) reports the outcomes for the 8, 638, 063 certificates accepted by our parser. The number of
certificates having standard features which are unsupported by the tested library is reported in brackets. Sub-table (b)
reports the outcomes for the 2, 361, 664 certificates rejected by our parser
(a) Libraries outcomes on the set of 8, 638, 063 certificates accepted by our parser
Library Syntactic Validation Generic DifferentialRejection Rejection Rejection Acceptance
OpenSSL 0 (8) 5, 613, 323 38 3, 024, 694
BoringSSL 0 (8) 5, 613, 122 38 3, 024, 895
GNUTLS 0 5, 108, 243 1 3, 529, 819
NSS 0 (2) 6, 081, 980 261 2, 555, 820
SecureTransport 0 6, 003, 250 2, 509 2, 632, 304
CryptoAPI 0 (60) 5, 491, 470 0 3, 146, 533
BouncyCastle 0 5, 508, 977 8, 341 3, 120, 752
(b) Libraries outcomes on the set of 2, 361, 664 certificates rejected by our parser
Library Syntactic Validation Generic Differential Whole Chain InvalidRejection Rejection Rejection Acceptance Acceptance Certification Paths
OpenSSL 62 1, 729, 655 7 631, 940 608, 838 1, 942, 174
BoringSSL 62 1, 729, 584 7 632, 011 608, 919 1, 942, 251
GNUTLS 4, 545 1, 200, 448 15 1, 156, 656 711, 663 3, 204, 136
NSS 33 1, 438, 864 21, 175 901, 592 478, 681 2, 758, 092
SecureTransport 0 1, 386, 281 33, 196 942, 187 483, 291 3, 398, 365
CryptoAPI 531 1, 310, 217 28 1, 050, 888 611, 524 3, 419, 740
BouncyCastle 5, 795 1, 214, 653 102, 383 1, 038, 833 605, 552 3, 412, 395
Comparison of Parsing Effectiveness.
Table 3(a) and Table 3(b) report a comparative analysis on the effectiveness of our parser against the validation capa-
bility of the other libraries.
The results in Table 3(a) show that no actual syntax errors are detected by the tested libraries on the set of 8, 638, 063
certificates accepted by our parser. Indeed, a small number of syntax errors are reported by them; however, through
manual inspection of these few certificates we confirmed that such errors are due to the lack of support for some
features of the X.509 standard by the the said libraries. In particular, both OpenSSL and CryptoAPI do not support
the recognition of some fields of generalNames in NameConstraints extension and have only partial support for
the algorithms included in the Russian standard suite GOST. Moreover, NSS does not match the OID for the MD5
hash algorithm unless explicitly forced to do so via a flag set during the validation process. While discarding MD5
signed certificates is a sound choice from a semantic standpoint, as MD5 is known to be cryptographically weak, not
matching the OID syntactically diverges from the standard recommendations. The absence of syntactic errors reported
by other libraries on certificates accepted by our parser is really meaningful, since it entails that there are no syntactic
flaws, identified by other libraries, which are missed by our parser. This is a practical outcome further validating
the compliance of our designed grammar to the X.509 standard. The high number of certificates accepted by our
parser and rejected by the libraries due to semantic validation errors confirms the sensible intuition that checking the
semantics of a certificate content (e.g., via a signature check) is a crucial point in its validation process.
Table 3(b) shows how the tested libraries fare on analyzing the certificates which our parser deems syntactically
incorrect. The first column of the said table shows that the portion of certificates recognized by the available libraries
as syntactically incorrect is remarkably small (i.e., less than 0.25% of 2, 361, 664 certificates), while a significant
amount of the considered set of certificates (around 56%–73.2%) are detected as invalid during the validation phase
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Table 4: Syntactic issues on the 468, 052 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by all the
tested libraries
Security Critical Number
keyCertSign in leaf certificates
1, 369
w/o basicConstraints
keyUsage violation
87, 524
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 97
Wrong string type 1, 289
Char Set Violation 14, 155
Bad DNS/URI/email format 341, 348
Lexing Error 15
Empty Issuer Distinguished Name 368
Duplicated Extension 1
Unexpected NULL
1
in AlgorithmIdP
OID Arc overflow 5
Wrong algorithm 21
Invalid date 122
Non Security Critical Number
keyCertSign encoding 2
Empty value field 3
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 10
pathLenConstraint in not
15
critical basicConstraints
Wrong extnId 24
generic error 56
missing subjectKeyId 61
not critical basicConstraints 65
wrong OID 83
pathLenConstraint
193
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 266
empty string 401
invalid Distinguished Name 2, 575
missing keyIdentifier
17, 983
in self-issued certificate
of the libraries (see the element-wise sum of the 2nd and the 3rd column in Table 3(b)). These results confirm the fact
that the certificate validation performed by libraries tightly blends syntactic validation and semantic checks, instead
of clearly splitting the two phases. Nonetheless, even the richness of semantic checking is not sufficient for the
tested libraries to detect all syntactically invalid certificates. Indeed, around 26.8%–44% of the set of 2, 361, 664
syntactically incorrect certificates are accepted by the tested libraries employing the differential analysis technique
described before (4th column in Table 3(b)). Such a result can be fruitfully interpreted comparing it with the one of the
rejections caused on the entire certification path of a given certificate (5th column in Table 3(b)). Indeed, we recall that
differential analysis accepts a certificate even if the outcome of the library validation flags it as invalid, if the reason for
the rejection is the same as another certificate on its certification path. Consequentially, comparing the results of the
whole chain acceptance with the differential acceptance ones points to the possibility that the effectiveness in rejecting
syntactically incorrect certificates of existing libraries is a consequence of the rejection of a different, invalid certificate
present in the same certification path of a syntactically wrong certificate. Indeed, the only cases where the differential
acceptance may underestimate the recognition capability of the libraries are the ones where in a certification path two
certificates with the same flaw are present. Nonetheless, even considering the maximum possible selectivity for the
existing libraries, i.e., deeming a certification path invalid as a whole, between 20.2% and 30.3% of the syntactically
invalid certificates are still deemed valid by existing libraries.
Finally, to quantify the extent of the missing rejections in the existing libraries we computed the set of certificates
which are deemed differentially accepted by them, but rejected by our parser. Having derived this set of certificates
we counted how many of the certificates in the entire certificate collection are either in the aforementioned set, or
are issued by one of the subjects of the certificates of the said set (i.e., a certificate in the differentially accepted
wrong certificates set is their ancestor in a certificate path). The last column of Table 3(b) reports the amount of such
certificates for each library, providing the number of certification paths where at least one certificate is deemed invalid
by us, and valid by the existing libraries, i.e., the amount of leaf certificates which are deemed valid when, according
to the recursive validation strategy, they shouldn’t be.
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Table 5: Syntactic issues on the 468, 087 certificate chains accepted by each one of the tested libraries
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
83, 033
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 1
Wrong string type 81
Char Set Violation 12, 167
Bad DNS/URI/email format 366, 536
Lexing Error 13
Invalid Date 1
Non Security Critical Number
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 2
Empty value field 2
empty generalNames 5
missing subjectKeyId 6
pathLenConstraint in not
15
critical basicConstraints
basicConstraints not critical 38
empty string 199
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 145
missing keyIdentifier
4, 852
in self-issued certificate
5.1 Detected Security Vulnerabilities
Table 4 reports the outcomes of our certificate parsing on the set of 468, 052 certificates deemed differentially valid by
all the other libraries (i.e., on the intersection of the sets accounted for in the 4th column of Table 3(b)), while the data
reported in Table 5 represents the outcomes of our parser on certificates belonging to a chain correctly validated by all
the considered libraries (i.e., on the set of 468, 052 certificates obtained as the intersection of the sets accounted for in
the penultimate column of Table 3(b)). Despite the reduction in the variety of errors reported in Table 5 with respect
to the ones in Table 4, we note that the errors appearing only in the latter are not guaranteed to be safely detected by
each library, while the ones in Table 5 are definitely evading detection by all the libraries. 1
Both tables categorize the errors splitting them in two groups, according to their potential in generating exploitable
security vulnerabilities. In the following, we detail the possible exploitation for each of these security critical errors,
providing a rationale for such criticality. While we deem relevant the detailed investigation of each of the highlighted
security flaws reported in this work, we provide only a single full proof-of-concept attack employing them, as the pur-
pose of this work is to build a sound X.509 parser preventing all of them altogether. We spur the detailed investigation
in this regard by releasing publicly our parser implementation [28].
The first and the third entry in Table 4 report issues on the keyCertSign bit being improperly set (either missing
the BasicConstraints extension or in a leaf certificate) potentially allowing their subject to act as a malicious CA.
We actually prove this attack to be feasible against some of the libraries, using certificates which exhibit this kind of
error. Character set violations and strings of a type different from the one expected may be exploited in the same way
as the already discussed issues about malformed DNS, URI or email addresses. Therefore, these issues may lead to
impersonation attacks arising from different interpretations of the same string. Lexing errors state an incorrect DER
encoding of ASN.1 structures which may lead to a variety of attacks depending on the type of violation. Examining
more closely some of them, we discovered that some implementations consider null character of byte strings such
as 0x02 0x01 0x03 0x00 in the DER encoded INTEGER (tag 2) of length 1 with value 3, which suggest such
implementations may be employing the outcome of the strlen C library function with the value of the actual length
field, or employ C string based input reading functions. More serious issues such as flawed checks on length fields
may lead to forgery attacks such as the ones reported in [11, 12]. The errors named as “Empty Issuer Distinguished
Names” imply that a certificate has no issuer, which may lead to security issues depending on how the issuer of
the certificate is retrieved by the implementation. The presence of duplicated extensions may lead to impersonation
1The outcomes of the syntactic analysis performed by our parser on the set of certificates accepted by the considered libraries
separately, are reported in Appendix A, Table A.2 for OpenSSL and BoringSSL, Table A.3 for GNUTLS, Table A.4 for Secure
Transport, Table A.5 for Bouncy Castle, Table A.6 for CryptoAPI, and Table A.7 for NSS
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Table 6: Number of hosts, distinguished via their names, for which a certificate deemed incorrect by our parser is
accepted by a library, considering the result of differential analysis
Library # Certificates # Names Affected
OpenSSL 631, 940 2, 143, 635
BoringSSL 632, 011 2, 143, 812
SecureTransport 942, 187 3, 890, 999
CryptoAPI 1, 050, 888 4, 253, 895
GNUTLS 1, 156, 656 4, 543, 605
NSS 901, 592 3, 786, 986
BouncyCastle 1, 038, 833 4, 196, 435
attacks, since implementations may employ the contents of one duplicate only, at their choice. A critical case for such
a behavior is the one of a certificate with two basicConstraints extensions, one with ca flag set to true while the
other one set to false. In such a case, it depends on an implementation-related choice whether to take into account
only at the first extension, and thus considering the subject a CA, or to consider the second extension valid deeming
the subject an end entity. Such misinterpretation may lead to powerful attacks where an end entity acts as a malicious
CA. Unexpected NULL in algorithmP means that there are no parameters for an algorithm, even if they are expected,
potentially weakening the security guarantees provided by some primitives (e.g., missing elliptic curve parameters in
ECDSA may lead to backtracking to an unsafe default choice). OID arc overflows indicate that a single arc of an
OID is indeed exceeding the maximum value set by the standard. While mishandling of arcs due to a short integer
representation is known to lead to practical attacks in flawed implementations [23], we note that an OID arc overflow
is potentially more dangerous as even standard abiding libraries will likely fail to manage it. Wrong Algorithm errors
imply that a non standard algorithm is employed. While the employed algorithm may still be a sound one, we note that
standardized algorithms have usually undergone a higher level of scrutiny. Finally, we report that some certificates
have non-existing dates in their validity specification (e.g., the 29th of February 2022), potentially resulting in an
erroneous expiration check.
5.2 Analysis of the Certificate Statuses on Distinct Hosts
Following the quantitative analysis on how many certificates are affected by potentially security threatening syntactic
flaws, we want to analyze the effect of such flaws when reflected onto the hosts which are employing the said cer-
tificates. To this end, we analyzed the contents of the Name ADT of the certificates, which usually contains one or
more URLs of the host for which the certificate is valid. Moreover, there is a particular standardized extension, called
Subject Alternative Names, which contains a further set of names (we consider DNS, email addresses, URLs
and URIs) which are related to the subject of the certificate. To evaluate the practical impact of flaws in the certificates
we report in Table 6 the amount of names bound to flawed certificates which are not detected by a library, but deemed
incorrect by our parser. As emerging from the data, on average 4 common names are present for each certificate,
thus pointing to a four-fold increase in the number of impacted hosts with respect to the rough estimate which can be
provided considering each certificate as used by a single host.
5.3 Parsing Vulnerability Exploitation
Willing to validate the practical exploitation of the security issues emerged we focus on the syntactic problem of a
certificate having no BasicConstraints (BC) extension, while having the keyCertSign bit set in the KeyUsage
extension (there are 1, 369 such instances as reported in Table 4). Refer to Figure 7 for the detailed structure of these
two extensions.
The BasicConstraints extension contains a single boolean field indicating whether the subject is a CA or not, and an
optional constraint on the maximum length of the certification path. The KeyUsage extension is a 9-bit string storing
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KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1),
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
Figure 7: KeyUsage and BasicConstraints extensions
flags which indicate the legitimate uses for the public key of the certificate subject. Semantically, the keyCertSign
flag allows the public key of the subject to be used to verify certificate signatures, but the subject must be a CA.
Such an information is contained in the cA Boolean field of BC, which has a default value of FALSE. Thus, if the
BasicConstraints extension is missing, the subject cannot be considered a CA and the certificate must be rejected.
An incorrect behavior in this case was reported in the recent OpenSSL bug report [24]: indeed OpenSSL versions prior
to 1.0.2d allowed such syntactically flawed certificates to be used as CA ones. The version of OpenSSL employed in
our experimental evaluation includes the bug fix reported in [24]; however such a fix is not addressing the root cause
of the issue, as a number of syntactically incorrect certificates are still deemed valid.
We reproduced the issue at hand in a certificate of which we own the private key, employing the said private key to
sign a forged certificate for paypal.com. The syntactically flawed certificate was signed with a private key of a CA
bootstrapped by us, and such a CA certificate was added to the trusted storages of the verifying clients, completing
the reproduction of the situation found in the wild. We provided the certification path of our forged paypal.com
certificate to OpenSSL both via the programming API, and via command-line client, employing the default validation
options, succeeding in getting it accepted as a valid certificate. An interesting remark is that such attack is mitigated if
the x509_strict option is set for the validation algorithm. However, this option is not enabled by default, leaving all
entities relying on default OpenSSL settings (which are expected to be the majority) vulnerable to this serious attack.
We were able to get the said certification path to be accepted also by BoringSSL, while the other libraries discard the
chain. Nonetheless, we confirm the practicality of the threat on two of the most used TLS implementations, including
the one employed by Chrome/Chromium. As a consequence, any one among the owners of the 1, 369 certificates of
the dataset with the said vulnerability are likely to be able to exploit it successfully, as such items have been signed
by a legitimate and trusted root CA. An inspection of such certificates show that some have been generated with the
Open Directory framework of Mac OS X Server, providing a pointer to a real world TLS implementation generating
syntactically incorrect certificates. Such implementations can be exploited by an attacker who could require a legit-
imate certificate for its own identity to such implementations. The generated certificate would suffer the mentioned
syntactic issue and could be used as an intermediate certificate to sign other certificates for an arbitrary identity. Such
certificates can later be used to perform a Man-In-The-Middle attack where a TLS session is successfully established
impersonating the subject of the fake certificate.
5.4 Performance Analysis
Finally, although our work focuses on the effectiveness of the proposed certificate parsing approach, we provide some
efficiency results of our parser. The performance results obtained running our parser on a 3.2GHz Intel i5-6500 based
desktop, running Gentoo Linux 13.0 (x86_64), are reported in Figure 8. The reported timings show how the vast
majority of the certificates can be recognized in less than 10 ms, a timing we deem acceptable for practical use, and
which may be improved employing a more efficient C code generation backend with respect to the current one in
ANTLR3. In addition to the absolute timings reported, it is interesting to note that the practical parsing complexity
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Figure 8: Parsing times for all the certificates present in our dataset. The blue line marks the linear interpolation of the
obtained data points, with equation Time=0.778·Size−0.203
appears to be substantially linear, despite the theoretical quadratic worst case of LL(*) parsers. Such a fact represents
a validation of our claim that the lookahead which the LL(*) parser requires is indeed far shorter than the entirety of
the remaining input, indeed resulting in near optimal (i.e., linear) parsing complexity.
6 Concluding Remarks
We presented a systematic approach to the parsing of X.509 digital certificates, analyzing the standard and providing
a description of the ADTs to be matched in terms of a predicate grammar. We generated systematically a parser from
the given grammar representation, and analyzed with it 11M X.509 certificates in use to secure TLS connections. We
report that 21.5% are syntactically incorrect and 7 of the most common TLS libraries deem authentic 5.7%–10.5%
of them. We provided a validation of the practicality of the threat represented by mis-parsed certificates, providing
a proof of concept of an effective impersonation attack stemming from them. We hope this work will encourage the
integration of our systematically generated parser in widespread TLS libraries, although it is also possible to employ
it as a stopgap measure in programs dynamically linked to existing libraries, including it within a wrapper to their API
calls. Although we provided a single proof-of-concept exploit of a security vulnerability among the ones we identified,
we believe exploring all the remaining ones will provide a concrete evaluation of the extent of the current issues in
X.509 certificates.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Classification of the outcomes of the certificate chain validation procedure for each one of the tested TLS
libraries as syntactic, validation or generic errors
Se
cu
re
Tr
an
sp
or
t Syntactic n/a
Validation kSecTrustResult deny
Validation kSecTrustResult recoverable trust
failure
Validation kSecTrustResult fatal trust failure
Generic kSecTrustResult other error
Generic kSecTrustResult invalid
G
N
U
T
L
S
Syntactic Insecure Algorithm
Validation Certificate signature failure
Validation Certificate signer not CA
Validation Certificate expired
Validation Certificate signer not found
Validation Invalid Certificate
Generic Signer constraints failure
O
pe
nS
SL
,B
or
in
gS
SL
Syntactic Unsupported constraint type
Syntactic No explicit policy
Validation Path length exceeded
Validation Permitted violation
Validation Certificate not yet valid
Validation Unhanded critical extension
Validation Unable to get issuer certificate
Validation Self-signed certificate in chain
Validation Certificate signature failure
Validation Certificate has expired
Validation Unable to get issuer certificate locally
Validation Depth zero self-signed certificate
Generic Invalid CA
Generic Invalid policy extension
Generic Unable to decode issuer public key
N
SS
Syntactic Signature algorithm disabled
Validation Untrusted certificate
Validation Bad signature
Validation Certificate not in namespace
Validation Untrusted issuer
Validation Expired certificate
Validation Unknown issuer
Generic Invalid arguments
Generic Inadequate key usage
Generic Inadequate certificate type
C
ry
pt
oA
PI
Syntactic Not supported name constraint
Syntactic NTE bad algorithm identifier
Syntactic Invalid date
Validation Forbidden name constraint
Validation Revoked
Validation Off-line revocation
Validation Weak signature
Validation Signature not valid
Validation Time not valid
Validation Partial chain
Validation Untrusted root
Generic Invalid arguments
Generic Inadequate key usage
Generic Inadequate certificate type
B
ou
nc
yC
as
tle
Syntactic Forbidden extension in v2 certificates
Syntactic Empty issuerDN
Syntactic URI must include scheme
Syntactic Empty subjectDN is not allowed in v1
certificates
Syntactic Invalid URI name
Syntactic Duplicate extensions are not allowed
Syntactic Signature algorithm mismatch
Syntactic No more data allowed for v1 certificate
Syntactic Incomplete X.509 certificate:
empty subject field, and absent
SubjectAlternativeName extension
Syntactic Incomplete X.509 certificate:
SubjectAlternativeName ex-
tension must be marked as critical,
when subject field is empty
Validation targetConstraints mismatch
Validation No issuer found in certification path
Validation Unable to find certificate chain
Generic certificate validation failed
Generic Certification path could not be vali-
dated
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Table A.2: Syntactic issues on the 608, 838(resp. 608, 919) certificates of the entire dataset differentially accepted by
OpenSSL(resp. BoringSSL)
Security Critical OpenSSL BoringSSL
keyUsage violation
126, 174 126, 182
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in
17 10
leaf certificates
Wrong string type 140 139
Char Set Violation 13, 913 13, 925
Bad DNS/URI/email
455, 539 455, 536
format
Lexing Error 57 57
Wrong algorithm 1 11
Extension found but
1 0
version 6= 3
Non Security Critical OpenSSL BoringSSL
Empty value field 2 3
Wrong OID in Distinguished
3 2
Name
pathLenConstraint in
10 11
not critical basicConstraints
generic error 4, 909 4, 909
missing subjectKeyId 59 80
not critical basicConstraints 65 74
wrong OID 88 89
pathLenConstraint
27 25
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 14 16
empty string 278 277
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 368 1, 370
missing keyIdentifier
6, 168 6, 196
in self-issued certificate
Bad BIT STRING encoding 1 1
Redundant Trailing Bytes 2 2
not critical basicConstraints
1 3
and missing subjectKeyId
Empty sequence in
1 1Authority/Subject
Information Access exts
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Table A.3: Syntactic issues on the 711, 663 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by
GNUTLS
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
151, 727
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 20
Wrong string type 397
Char Set Violation 16, 637
Bad DNS/URI/email format 514, 645
Lexing Error 14
Wrong algorithm 2
Duplicated Extensions 2
Non Security Critical Number
Empty value field 2
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 3
pathLenConstraint in not
12
critical basicConstraints
generic error 4, 907
missing subjectKeyId 52
not critical basicConstraints 57
wrong OID 96
pathLenConstraint
124
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 12
empty string 487
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 638
missing keyIdentifier
20, 825
in self-issued certificate
Redundant Trailing Bytes 1
not critical basicConstraints
1
and missing subjectKeyId
Empty sequence in Authority/Subject
1
Information Access extensions
Wrong extnId 1
Table A.4: Syntactic issues on the 483, 291 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by
Secure Transport
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
86, 276
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 4
Wrong string type 84
Char Set Violation 12, 558
Bad DNS/URI/email format 377, 788
Lexing Error 14
Wrong algorithm 1
Non Security Critical Number
Empty value field 2
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 2
pathLenConstraint in not
8
critical basicConstraints
missing subjectKeyId 31
not critical basicConstraints 85
empty generalNames 5
empty string 207
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 163
missing keyIdentifier
5, 060
in self-issued certificate
Redundant Trailing Bytes 2
Empty sequence in Authority/Subject
1
Information Access extensions
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Table A.5: Syntactic issues on the 608, 038 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by
Bouncy Castle
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
126, 232
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 3
Wrong string type 137
Char Set Violation 13, 710
Bad DNS/URI/email format 452, 630
Lexing Error 13
Wrong algorithm 1
Non Security Critical Number
Empty value field 2
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 2
pathLenConstraint in not
8
critical basicConstraints
generic error 4, 907
missing subjectKeyId 25
not critical basicConstraints 57
wrong OID 88
pathLenConstraint
26
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 6
empty string 274
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 355
missing keyIdentifier
6, 073
in self-issued certificate
Redundant Trailing Bytes 2
Empty sequence in Authority/Subject
1
Information Access extensions
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Table A.6: Syntactic issues on the 611, 524 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by
CryptoAPI
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
121, 686
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 10
Wrong string type 194
Char Set Violation 14, 105
Bad DNS/URI/email format 462, 238
Lexing Error 14
Wrong algorithm 1
Wrong keyCertSign ASN.1 enc. 1
Non Security Critical Number
Empty value field 3
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 2
pathLenConstraint in not
12
critical basicConstraints
generic error 4, 907
missing subjectKeyId 23
not critical basicConstraints 94
wrong OID 105
pathLenConstraint
29
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 7
empty string 523
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 421
missing keyIdentifier
6, 146
in self-issued certificate
Redundant Trailing Bytes 2
Empty sequence in Authority/Subject
1
Information Access extensions
Table A.7: Syntactic issues on the 478, 681 certificates of the entire dataset, which are differentially accepted by NSS
Security Critical Number
keyUsage violation
87, 187
on PK algorithm
keyCertSign in leaf certificates 2
Wrong string type 98
Char Set Violation 12, 832
Bad DNS/URI/email format 372, 132
Lexing Error 14
Wrong algorithm 1
Non Security Critical Number
Empty value field 2
Wrong OID in Distinguished Name 2
pathLenConstraint in not
7
critical basicConstraints
missing subjectKeyId 20
not critical basicConstraints 54
wrong OID 62
pathLenConstraint
1
in leaf certificates
empty generalNames 6
empty string 202
invalid Distinguished Name 1, 177
missing keyIdentifier
4, 881
in self-issued certificate
Redundant Trailing Bytes 1
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